4. Conclusions

The NAIS Interim Report, and our observations about the need for representation and participation among At-Large Directors and for At-Large Members, is based on a specific sense of ICANN¹s purposes and trajectory. But the purpose of ICANN and goals of its current participatory structure must be better understood to assess the At-Large Directors and Membership.

It is impossible to have a community assessment of the At-Large Directors without some common understanding of what ICANN is and what purpose is to be served by the At-Large Directors. One view of ICANN places it somewhere on a continuum that extends from a private and narrowly technical group, on the one hand, to the effective equivalent of a government agency, on the other. But there is a broad divergence of opinion about where ICANN lies on that continuum. Another view emphasizes ICANN's role as a new and transformative structure for global, non-governmental coordination of technical functions. At issue is the extent to which ICANN can serve this purpose.

If ICANN is a public entity formulating policy about the Internet, with broad impact on the public globally, then the legitimacy of ICANN will depend on public representation. If ICANN is viewed as a private business engaged in narrow technical work, the case for public participation in its decisions or selection of its directors is weaker. In either case, the need to ensure global participation must be resolved. Differing opinions on these questions may explain highly polarized views regarding global public representation within ICANN.

Last year's election process is a motivating example for considering how to best promote goals of public participation and representation through the At-Large Directors. The election was widely viewed with both some satisfaction and significant skepticism. In general, the election appeared to function reasonably well consistent with its own internal rules and expectations, but surfaced serious concerns about future implementations. Many concerns - problems with election registration servers, the absence of clear election rules - appear addressable in future elections. Others problems - nationalistic voting patterns, voter education and outreach - are likely to be longer-term concerns.

Against this backdrop, ICANN now faces a range of options - some that embrace elections while mitigating concerns, others eschewing direct democracy or reducing the role of the public. NAIS intends to submit a more complete assessment of these options, along with recommendations for Board action, in September with its final report.

Finally, we emphasize the need for a speedy resolution of this issue. In its absence, ICANN's At-Large board seats continue to be filled in part by appointed members who have long since exceeded their initial term of office. The elected Directors themselves will need replacement in 2002. ICANN's own Bylaws call for a study to be completed in June 2001, and a Board decision by November so that work can begin on whatever mechanism is put in place. While the June deadline will not be met, the November deadline is essential. Every day that passes without resolving this issue decreases the legitimacy of decisions that ICANN is making. We urge the ICANN Board to commit to a thoughtful but rapid deliberation, and to avoid action - whether through timing of decisions or allocation of funds - that would preclude it from considering the full range of options that may be placed before it.

The NAIS Project welcomes comment and feedback on this document. For more information, please visit our web site at http://www.naisproject.org/. Comments or questions can be addressed to comments@naisproject.org.

3. Options for At-Large Governance

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