One of the signal difficulties for the 2000 At-Large election seems to have been the lack of a well-defined, widely supported list of the community's goals for the election - a consensus on what the election was really supposed to accomplish and in what cases it could be considered a success. Not only did this make objective post-election analysis difficult, it significantly complicated the development of the election system itself. Choices about election systems, voting models, technical provisions, membership requirements, and even nominations were all made without reference to shared priorities, and as a result they were seen by some as inconsistent, even at times suspicious.
Ultimately, this problem stems from a series of quick and unexpected shifts in the way the Board presented the election. From the MAC report to Cairo to Yokohama, ideas about what the 2000 election would look like and how it would work bounced around the spectrum of possibility before finally coming to rest (on the direct election model) in July 2000 - just three months before voting began, and over four months after registration for the election had opened.
This uncertainty as to the form and function of the election system had complicated roots in ICANN's history and political landscape. As is discussed above, strong direction on the subject of public participation could be found neither in ICANN's founding documents nor in the opinions of the men and women who had a hand in creating the new organization. Not surprisingly, quick resolution of the election question eluded ICANN throughout its early history. Still, the Board, under strong pressure to move quickly, pressed forward in circumstances where delay, had it been possible, might have been preferable.
Some have also voiced concern about the privileged position occupied by staff not only to prepare proposals on important policy matters like the development of an election system, but to advise the Board on approving those proposals. It seems clear that some staff proposals, such as those in Cairo and Yokohama, were made in the absence of even the roughest community consensus. Fortunately, the Board detected community dissatisfaction in those cases. In the future, though, one hopes that the Board and staff would attempt to move forward only in cases of demonstrated consensus, not merely an absence of popular outcry.
The importance of geographic diversity to ICANN, especially at the Board level, can be traced back to the organization's early history. But while most of the ICANN community has agreed on the importance of such diversity, debates about how best to achieve it were extremely contentious. The election bylaws passed by unanimous consent in October 1999 called for an At-Large Council divided into five now-familiar geographic regions. [ 13 ] In defining those regions, the risk of privileging (accidentally or otherwise) certain nations, language groups, or vested interests over others was substantial, and could have had lasting effects on ICANN. In recognition of this problem, the short time available and ICANN's limited funds, the Board defined its geographic regions based on standards previously established by the United Nations. [ 14 ]
The five-region model was low-resolution but high-efficiency. Its adoption cleared the way for a speedy and manageable election, but did so at the cost of representative legitimacy. Some members of the ICANN community have pointed out that At-Large members in, say, Israel, India, and Indonesia (all members of the "Asia/Australia/Pacific" region) will have extremely different points of view on many ICANN-related issues, and that a single Directorship fails to represent all the interests involved. The point is well taken.
On the other hand, ICANN's relationship with the Internet community is built less on political theories of representative legitimacy than on the idea that ICANN's activities will be defined by community consensus. [ 15 ] A certain geographic diversity greatly assists ICANN in identifying that consensus. But an over-broad system of political representation in the traditional sense could interfere with ICANN's consensus-based processes, even pushing ICANN into areas of policy-making it ought not to enter. Balance is necessary, and in that light the five-region model seems reasonable. It brings diversity to the Board, without implying unrealistic notions of authority.
At the same time, the regional model offers structural protection against the problem of capture - the risk that a populous country or well-organized interest group could seize control of the Board and interfere with the Internet's basic mode of administration. Even a large and well-organized group would find it difficult to coordinate the capture of Board seats across all five regions.
The Election Committee also seems to have suffered from definitional problems. The Board created the Election Committee in May 2000 to make recommendations on "procedures regarding the At-Large elections", [ 16 ] but that mission seems overbroad, given the shortage of available time and the lack of clear community consensus on precisely what the elections were supposed to accomplish. Subtle differences in election systems, fraud protections, and even candidate campaigning weigh heavily on the election's ultimate character and results. Uncertainty about what that character and results ultimately should look like seems to have hindered the Election Committee's ability to proceed surely in its work.
This was perhaps most evident in the technical support for the election provided by election.com. While the specifics of the technical problems encountered are discussed below, ICANN's request for bids from election contractors would have benefited substantially from the Election Committee's collective expertise. Vague instructions about the election's purposes and goals may have prevented the development of thorough recommendations.
The Election Committee encountered substantial criticism and controversy as a result of its attempt to propose rules for member-nomination. Advocates for the public interest have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the member-nomination process as a way to provide the user community with easy access to the ballot, outside the control of ICANN-related bodies. In its initial recommendation of election rules, the Election Committee proposed that all would-be member-nominees be required to show support from at least 10% of their regional electorate - a figure widely decried as an unrealistic one, and one that would put the ballot out of reach of all potential member-nominees. Under pressure, the Election Committee revised its recommendation to the fairer (and basically successful) 2% showing.
On balance the Election Committees final recommendations were good ones. The low barrier to ballot access for member-nominated candidates was successful; the preferential voting system, though perhaps not perfect, struck most participants as intuitively fair; [ 17 ] and, as discussed above, the regional voting system made sense in its context.
| 2.1.2. Description of the 2000 Election | 2.1.4. Decisions Regarding Membership Relations |
© 2001 NAISProject.org
Privacy Policy
webmaster@naisproject.org