5. Conclusion

In some ways, ICANN has achieved remarkable success in its short life span, and has already accomplished many of the threshold tasks set out in its founding documents and agreements with the U.S. Government.

In other important ways, however, ICANN remains remarkably fragile, uncertain of its procedures, roiled by internal disputes, and destabilized by ongoing restructuring. These internal problems are echoes of a common theme-an organizational identity crisis about what ICANN is and why it is legitimate.

ICANN's fate over the long term is inextricably dependent upon finding a compelling answer to these questions, and resolving the riddle of its legitimacy. Not a government; not a multi-lateral treaty organization; not a trade association; not a for-profit business; not a regulatory agency; not an NGO-it is easier to say what ICANN is not than what it is. But ICANN must define itself, even if doing so means creating a new category of definition. And then it must build a persuasive argument on that definition for how it is to attain real legitimacy.

In our view, given our conception of what ICANN is-an experimental quasi-public global organization with important responsibilities for a critical global infrastructure that must be managed as a public trust to serve the public interest-real legitimacy comes only when ICANN establishes robust and effective structures for a public voice to participate and be represented within the institutions of ICANN's internal governance.

There are important lessons to be learned from the election in 2000. ICANN created an At-Large Membership for the purpose of electing board members, yet failed to take steps to solidify that membership before, during and especially after the election period. As a result, community faith in the ICANN process seems to have been significantly shaken and, at the very least, an opportunity to harness a substantial amount of user energy was squandered.

Virtually everyone we interviewed commented on the lack of clarity of purpose that pervaded the elections and the opacity of process that accompanied it. Choices about pivotal details of the election (including voting and vote counting models and technical requirements) were made behind closed doors in what often seemed to be an arbitrary or inconsistent manner. After the election concluded, ICANN essentially dismantled the 2000 At-Large Membership.

These choices appear to be indicative of ambivalence by the ICANN staff and board about having a vibrant and diverse public voice in ICANN. But the public voice provides an essential component of ICANN's legitimacy, and therefore should not be viewed as simply an option or as a requirement of "compliance" with its founding documents. Rather, the At-Large Membership is fundamental to ICANN's long-term survival and its ability to make the kinds of public policy decisions that have proven fundamental to its work.

This is why it is essential for ICANN to establish a real, lasting At-Large Membership, with a clear means to participate in the decision-making process and a right to direct representation on the board. A formal internal structure for the membership will enable it not only to vote for board members, but also to participate in ICANN's processes in a meaningful way. At least in its initial stages, it is crucial that ICANN's current board and staff see the at-large membership as a priority, and act on that vision.

Our study considered other models for the inclusion of the public voice. We considered more restrictive parameters for determining who would be eligible for the At-Large Membership, which might have made voter authentication a simpler matter. In the end, we rejected this option as exclusionary and counterproductive to the goal of representing the public voice.

We also considered different ways that the public might exercise some level of authority in the ICANN process, such as giving the Membership some form of oversight role rather than actual board seats, or a strictly advisory role. We came back, however, to the recognition that the ICANN Board of Directors holds the real power to direct ICANN policies, and that it is therefore crucial that the public be represented in that space.

We view the direct election of At-Large Directors as the best way to legitimize ICANN and bolster its public voice. However, we arrived at this conclusion only after thinking about and debating the merits and flaws of this model as compared to others. Ultimately, our recommendations are based upon the realities governing ICANN's operation, history, and mission, and our conviction that the public's voice in ICANN is crucial to its success. We understand that the difficulties in establishing a functional At-Large Membership are not trivial; however, we also believe these difficulties are trumped by the need for ICANN to have the legitimacy to make the decisions it makes.

We recognize that realities change and that the At-Large Membership needs the flexibility to adapt to the times. The Membership is likely to find, as time passes, that some of its mechanisms work better than others. We endorse the idea of giving the Membership the ability to shape its own future, once it is launched.

In the near term, however, ICANN needs to take the lead in establishing initial processes that will enable the At-Large Membership to grow and mature. These include internal mechanisms such as the Membership Council and Secretariat, which will take the theory of a public voice and translate it into a real, practical membership body, as well as structures that will connect the At-Large Membership to ICANN's processes and decisions.

There is little precedent here; few guideposts by which to chart the path forward. ICANN itself is an experiment in the private regulation of a global public resource, and the At-Large Membership is an experiment within that experiment æ the lack of ready models is part of what makes this problem so hard. We do not underestimate the challenge here, but we believe the success of ICANN hinges on meeting the challenge.

The Internet is about empowerment æ about giving information, and giving voice, to individuals around the globe. What more appropriate opportunity than for ICANN itself to use the power of the Internet to harness the public voice needed to make its own work legitimate. By solving the riddle of this internal experiment, ICANN will take a great step toward securing a more stable grounding to ensure the success of its own, larger experiment.

Implementation Recommendations

Conceptual Framework

• ICANN more than technical body; decisions have policy implications
• ICANN must have baseline legitimacy to make decisions in these areas
• Role of public voice in internal governance crucial in establishing this legitimacy
• Existing structures are inadequate for incorporation of public voice

The Need for an Inclusive, Open Membership

• At-Large Membership (ALM): bottom-up organization, open to all interested members of the Internet public, that provides a meaningful channel for input into the ICANN process.
• Membership open to all who complete a simple online registration and activate their membership through a postal-return-based system.
• Supported as part of the ICANN budget by the community of stakeholders that fund ICANN's activities, as a necessary component of ICANN's legitimacy.

At-Large Membership: Participatory Structure

• Member Council, elected by members, will oversee processes and guide Secretariat.
• Secretariat (appointed) will facilitate flow of information within ALM and from ALM to ICANN's structures
• Working committees will develop policy positions
• ALM will foster the creation of local, regional, and national associations that encourage participation

At-Large Membership: Representation on the Board

• Representation of the At-Large Membership provided through the direct election of a number of At-Large Directors equal to the total number of Directors allocated to the Supporting Organizations (i.e., nine At-Large Directors in the current Board structure).
• Board-level representation to be balanced along regional and global lines.
• Measures should be introduced to prevent nationalistic capture of board seats

  Authentication Mechanism: Each person voting in election must have online identity tied to a real offline "personality" and have only one voting record in the At-Large database. The postal return system continues to strike the best balance between security, cost, and inclusiveness.

Accountability Mechanisms

• In order to prevent unwanted expansion of ICANN's mission, limitations on the scope of the Board's activities and powers, including bylaws and charter changes, explicit statements of user rights, and internal checks and balances within ICANN should be explored.
• In addition to the At-Large Membership, ICANN should pursue additional mechanisms to improve the Board's accountability and transparency.
• Separate from reform of the At-Large Membership, there is a strong desire by many in the community to reform the Supporting Organizations. We support reform of the Supporting Organization structure, but believe that such reform can and should be done independently of the At-Large Membership debate.

The NAIS Project welcomes comment and feedback on this document. For more information, please visit our web site at http://www.naisproject.org/. Comments or questions can be addressed to comments@naisproject.org.

© 2001 NAISProject.org
Privacy Policy
webmaster@naisproject.org