This is a model that is not uncommon in the commercial world, where a corporation might appoint a "public member" to protect the public interest.
But the corporate selection of such trustees in the private sector is a very incomplete analogy here because ICANN is a very atypical corporation, having the character of a public/private hybrid.
The hope is that the board might select highly qualified individuals who would, by dint of their stature, background and reputation, command public confidence in their role as a trustee. The risk, however, is that entrenched incumbents might only appoint like-minded Board members to the exclusion of other views important to the broader public.
Public confidence in the selection of At-Large Directors flows from the process as well as from the result. Because an elected Director is chosen by the community through a public means, it is likely that his or her selection will be accepted by the community. That is one of the lessons of last year's election, where there has been a great deal of acceptance of the five At-Large Directors selected, almost without reference to a particular individual's objective qualifications as compared to other candidates on the ballot, or other possible selections. The fact of a choice made through public participation best validates the role of the board member as public trustee. Selection of a public trustee for the board by the incumbent board members is not likely to achieve this goal.
| 3.3.3.3 At Large Directors selected by intermediary "public interest" organizations | 3.3.3.5 Indirect Elections |
© 2001 NAISProject.org
Privacy Policy
webmaster@naisproject.org