3.3.3.2 At Large Directors appointed by Governments

Another model proposes that governments-often viewed as the traditional representatives of the public-select the "public" or at-large members of the ICANN board. The argument for this approach is that governments are institutions that by definition embody the public interest of each sovereign state, and are therefore best situated to select representatives to protect the public interest in the work of ICANN.

But this approach raises problems similar to those, discussed above in section 3.2.3, of relying on the Government Advisory Committee to adequately represent the public voice in ICANN.

Above all else, the selection of at-large directors by Governments would turn ICANN into the functional equivalent of a multilateral treaty organization-an international body composed, at least in significant part, of government-appointed representatives who sit on its board.

This is in fundamental conflict with an essential tenet of ICANN-which is to be a non-governmental entity. ICANN was created in order to privatize regulation of the Internet-not just from the U.S. Government but from governments in general. It is a commonly said that governments do not work in "Internet time"-that they are dilatory and inefficient, and that a multilateral organization is a poor substitute for an effective private organization that is structured to embody a public voice. That was the promise of the original White Paper and we think it was right.

An additional Œgovernmental' strand of thought is to have governments appoint public trustees to the board of ICANN. The envisaged advantages of these public appointments include independence, status, expertise and continuity. However, as the lessons with "quangos" in the UK and elsewhere have indicated, public appointees are often seen as lacking the legitimacy required to represent the public interest, are often unconnected with the constituency they are supposed to serve and are prone to patronage. For these reasons "quangos" have become an increasingly unpopular and uncommon means of governance.

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