1.3.1 Definition of the "public"

There are various ways to define which "public" has an interest in ICANN. The answer is perhaps best thought of as a sliding scale, from a narrow definition focused on domain name holders-those stakeholders who are most directly affected by ICANN policies-to a much broader definition that includes all those who "use" the Internet, such as all e-mail address holders. Even beyond this, the broadest definition would essentially include the entire public-both those who currently use the Internet and those who are potential users in the future.

In our view, ICANN should recognize that its decisions have a broad impact. Because the Internet is a global resource, decisions about the functionality of the Internet have a global impact. And because the Internet is used directly by individuals on a global basis, that impact extends down to the individual level.

It is important as well to acknowledge that the class of those affected is dynamic. As the Internet expands, particularly in underdeveloped regions, the class of individuals who begin using it will grow. Yet these potential users of tomorrow will be impacted by the decisions ICANN makes today in setting domain name policy that will structure the Internet in the future.

As explained in more detail below, an open, easy-to-access web- or e-mail-based registration process could form the basis for a cost-effective and inclusive membership. Such systems approach universal availability for ICANN's potential membership and, as will be discussed below, support reasonable levels of authentication and security. Their openness, moreover, lends an important legitimizing effect to ICANN.

NAIS considered many other criteria for membership. Limiting membership to holders of domain names is one popular alternative, but was ultimately rejected by the group for several reasons:

The interested stakeholders include Internet users who are not necessarily domain name holders. We note that ICANN is charged with coordination of functions beyond the DNS-including addressing and some aspects of protocols-and so a membership limited to DN holders would be a highly imperfect match for those interested in participation in ICANN.
Domain name holders as a group are dominated by parties already well-represented in the SO structure. VeriSign has estimated that over 80% of current gTLD registrants are commercially-oriented organizations. In some ccTLDs, individuals cannot even own domain names. Limiting membership to domain name holders would create a membership pool that under-includes individuals and is heavily skewed towards commercial groups and organizations.
Substantial questions abound regarding the relationship between domain name ownership and voting privileges. Will companies that own more than one domain name have more than one membership and vote? If so, large organizations and domain name warehousers will be heavily over-represented. If not, substantial problems are created in determining who casts votes and what is a duplicate organization.
Many TLD managers, particularly in the ccTLD space, have differing requirements about how and by whom a domain name may be registered. Some domains, for example, do not permit individual registration, while others offer only registration at the third- and fourth-level. Proposals to restrict the Membership to domain name holders fail to address these and other questions about Internet citizens' access to names.
This proposal does not solve as many problems as claimed. Capture is still possible through the registration of many names. The number of members is still potentially very high. Authentication to guarantee "one person one vote," if desired, is still virtually impossible.

Similarly, NAIS rejected the use of a fee as a criteria for membership. As noted in more detail below, imposing a fee raises serious equity issues, even with substantial sliding scales for poorer regions. While likely to weed out less committed members, a fee still leaves the possibility for over-representation of those with financial resources and potential gaming of the membership by wealthy interests or countries. NAIS is cognizant of the need to pay for membership activities, but we note the cost of administration and international money transfers, and question the extent to which an equitable fee would raise sufficient funds without jeopardizing inclusiveness and legitimacy.

ICANN should broadly construe the "public" affected, and potentially affected, by its decisions. A broad, open concept of membership is the best way to achieve this.

1.3 Public Participation and the At-Large Membership

1.3.2 Definition of "participation"