In early October 1998, ICANN submitted its proposal to become the corporation envisioned in the White Paper. The proposed bylaws submitted in this process established a governing structure for ICANN that attempted to strike the balance called for in the White Paper. ICANN proposed a 19-member board, which would include the corporation's appointed president. Nine board members would be selected three each by three Supporting Organizations created to represent specific Internet stakeholders-the IP number registries, domain name registries, domain name registrars, and the technical community. The remaining nine seats would be occupied by "At-Large Directors"-though, once again, the form and function of those Directors was left largely undefined.
To guide ICANN in its formative stages, a nine-member Initial Board of experienced people from industry, academia, and the research sector was created. ICANN's process for selecting this Initial Board was widely criticized for its lack of openness and inclusiveness, and many questioned the fundamental legitimacy of this Board (and still do, as four of its members remain on the ICANN Board today).
One of the chief responsibilities given this Initial Board was to determine the process for selecting the At-Large Directors who would later replace the Initial Board itself. Early drafts of the bylaws suggested that this would involve the creation of an At-Large membership to elect these nine directors. However, these bylaws left the Initial Board with broad discretion to fill in the details regarding the selection of the At-Large Directors, and even to determine whether or not a membership system would be part of the process.
These initial bylaws received significant criticism from groups like the Boston Working Group (BWG) for giving excessively broad authority to the Initial Board. There were no protections against the Initial Board, should they so desire, simply deciding not to have any kind of At-Large membership whatsoever. Some went so far as to express concerns that the Initial Board had the power to reject not only the notion of a At-Large membership, but also the more general underlying principle of having At-Large Directors who would represent "users" to begin with.
The BWG strongly lobbied Commerce for revisions that would require the Initial Board to create some kind of membership structure (the specifics of which had not yet been determined). Ultimately, Commerce agreed, and ICANN, under pressure, revised its bylaws accordingly. Shortly thereafter, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between ICANN and Commerce, under which ICANN began assuming the responsibilities set forth in the White Paper.
| 1.2.1 Early Commitments to the Internet "Public" | 1.2.3 The MAC Report |
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